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Introduction
Nongovernmental organizations or lawyers concerned with improv-
ing the observance of internationally recognized human rights are
faced with the basic question: "Where do we begin?"1 During the past
twenty-five years, an important evolution in human rights law has
taken place. An internationally accepted body of human rights princi-
ples has been developed, and international procedures have been cre-
ated for implementing those norms.2 The basic problem for the human
t Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author is grateful for the assistance
of Jean Boler and Diane Isaacson, students at the University of Minnesota Law School, in
preparing this Comment. A shortened version of this Comment will appear as a chapter in
the Guide to International Human Ri'ghts Practice, to be published in 1983 by the University
of Pennsylvania Press.
I. For a discussion of the particular role lawyers may play in the implementation of
human rights, see Clark, Enforcement of International Human Rights, 28 CHrvY's L.J. 4
(1980); Clark, International Human Rights Fact-Finding: The Role of Legal Representation,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FACT-FINDING IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS (B.
Ramcharan ed. forthcoming); Salter, American Lawyers and Russian Dissidents, 12 INT'L
LAWYER 869 (1978). For suggestions on possible nongovernmental organizations strategies,
see GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PUBLIC POLICIES, COMPARATIVE MEASURES, AND NGO
STRATEGIES (V. Nanda, J. Scarrett, G. Shepard eds. 1981).
2. The United Nations has contributed significantly to the development of human rights
law. See, e.g., International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol,
G.A. Res. 2200(A), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967); E.S.C. Res. 1296, 44 U.N. ESCOR Supp.
(No. I) at 21, U.N. Doc. E/4548 (1968); E.S.C. Res. 1503, 48 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1A)
at 8, U.N. Doc. 4832/Add.1 (1970); E.S.C. Res. 728F, 28 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 19,
U.N. Doc. E/3290 (1959); E.S.C. Res. 1235, 42 ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 17, U.N. Doc. E/
4393 (1967); Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Res. 1 (XXIV), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1070, E/CN.4/Sub. 4323, at 50 (1971). Recently, new
petition procedures for UNESCO have been initiated. See Alston, UNESCO's Procedure
for Dealing with Human Rights Violations, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 665 (1980); Marks,
UNESCO and Human Rights: The Implementation of Rights Relating to Education, Science,
Culture and Communication, 13 TEx. INT'L L.J. 35 (1977). See generally Premont, United
Nations Procedures for the Protection of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 603 (1980); HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMPILATION OF
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/i (1973).
European and inter-American human rights systems have also evolved during the recent
past. See Council of Europe, Bringing an Application Before the European Commission of
Human Rights, in 3 CASE LAW TOPICS 1 (1974); Farer & Rowles, The Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE 68 (J.
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rights advocate today is how to use the present norms and procedures
to achieve concrete improvement in actual conditions. This Comment
considers how this herculean effort might be approached by examining
the experience of domestic and international human rights organiza-
tions. It proposes a strategy that might be useful to nongovernmental
organizations, lawyers, and activists concerned with human rights.
I. Alternative Strategies
International human rights organizations and activists have adopted
a number of strategies which suffer from serious drawbacks. For exam-
ple, some organizations have selected a single issue (such as torture)3 or
Tuttle ed. 1978); Norris, Bringing Human Rights Petitions Before the Inter-American Commis-
sion, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 733 (1980); O'Boyle, Practice and Procedure Under the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 697 (1980); Sandfifer, The
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Republic, June 1965 to June
1966, in THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 (A. Thomas, Jr. & A. Thomas eds. 1967).
New procedures have been developed through the venerable International Labour Organi-
zation. See Landy, The Implementation Procedures ofthe International Labour Organization,
20 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 633 (1980); Poulantzas, International Protection ofHuman Rights:
Implementation Procedures Within the Framework of the International Labour Organization,
25 REv. HELLENIQUE DE DROIT INT'L 110 (1972); Wolf, Aspects Judiciaires de la Protection
Internationale des Droits de l'Homme par l'OIT, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS J. 773 (1971); Wolf,
IL. 0. Experience in the Implementation of Human Rights, 10 J. INT'L LAW & ECON. 599
(1975).
Arguably, some new treaties would be helpful. See generally Declaration on the Protec-
tion of All Persons from Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 3453, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 92, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975); Declaration on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CHILDREN (1979); AM-
NESTY INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN FOR THE ABOLITION OF TORTURE, WORKSHOP ON
HUMAN RIGHTS (1975); Torture as Policy: The Network of Evil, TIME, Aug. 16, 1976, at 31-
34. In addition, more work is needed to assure full domestic implementation of interna-
tional norms. Compare Filartiga v. Pefla-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) with Sei Fujii v.
State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); see also Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
Over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act 4fter Filartiga v. Pefia-
Ira/a, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 53, 100 n.198 (1981); Comment, International Law and Human
Rights: Alien Tort Claims Under 28 U.SC. 1350: Filartia v. Peaa-Irala, 66 MINN. L. REv.
357, 375 (1982). However, the principal task of the human rights movement today is to use
established norms and principles to improve the recognition and protection of basic human
rights.
3. In 1972 Amnesty International selected torture as a particular target. The organiza-
tion called together an international conference in Paris in 1973 to focus attention on torture
and to publicize the problem. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, CONFERENCE FOR THE ABO-
LITION OF TORTURE, PARIS 10-11 DECEMBER 1973, FINAL REPORT (1973). Although the
International Bill of Human Rights forbids torture, there was a need for further elaboration
of that norm and for greater international attention to torture as a human rights violation.
Ackerman, Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Unusual Punishment in International Law,
11 VAND. J. TRANSNA'L L. 653, 653-56 (1978). In 1973 and 1975, the U.N. General Assem-
bly passed resolutions which raised world consciousness and made more specific the prohibi-
tion of torture. G.A. Res. 3059, 28 GAOR Supp. (No. 21) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/1:974 (1973);
G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975). Amnesty
International also published a book discussing the international norms against torture and
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a cluster of issues which requires initial attention. Under such a strat-
egy, however, an organization faces the problem of selecting an issue
which can generate the requisite world consensus for effective imple-
mentation measures. In addition, the organization must then select
which of many violations deserves first attention.4
A second approach is to select a target nation from among the most
flagrant human rights violators without focusing on a single issue.5 It
is, however, nearly impossible to compare different sorts of violations.
For example, how can one identify the worst violator when one country
imprisons,6 another country tortures, 7 and a third causes many people
describing the use of torture in each country where it occurred: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
REPORT ON TORTURE (1975). In addition to publicity, the organization developed new in-
ternational techniques for attempting to stop torture. A principal technique was the Urgent
Action Network, which responds immediately to any threats of torture throughout the
world. Whenever the A.I. Secretariat learns of an arrest or disappearance where torture is
likely, it sends thousands of Urgent Action appeals to members throughout the world. The
members then send letters and telegrams to identified responsible officials. This approach
has achieved considerable success in abating the practice of torture. See AMNESTY INTER-
NATIONAL REPORT 1978, at 16 (1978); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1977, at 30-32
(1977); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1976, at 25 (1976). One human rights activist
has analogized the strategic choices faced by A.I. in ending torture to the earlier efforts of
the Anti-Slavery Society to abolish slavery. S. CARROLL, THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BRITISH ANTI-SLAvEkY MOVEMENT I (unpublished manuscript 1977) (on file with The Yale
Journal of World Public Order).
Amnesty International has tried to follow the same approach with the death penalty, be-
ginning with a series of regional conferences and then a December, 1978 world conference in
Stockholm. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE ABOLI-
TION OF THE DEATH PENALTY (1978). Again, the organization published a very substantial
book on the subject: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY (1979). Since capital
punishment is such a widespread practice, the organization selected about eight nations
where the death penalty was a particularly grave problem. The nations also were selected
for geographical, political, and ethnic diversity. Having targeted representative states, A.I.
has experimented with new techniques for changing attitudes on the death penalty. It has
again used the Urgent Action Network. It has sought further attention in the U.N. system
and it has designated some of its more than 2,500 local groups to study the death penalty in
the target countries, to write letters to responsible officials, and to generate publicity about
the death penalty. For example, a group in the U.S. might be asked to study, publicize,
write letters, and work on the death penalty in Iraq. Groups in Sweden might be asked to
work on the death penalty in Nigeria, etc. It is too soon to determine the success of these
techniques in abolishing one of the most difficult human rights problems. See generally
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 19-20 (1980); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL RE-
PORT 1978, at 22-24 (1978).
4. For example, in its campaign against the death penalty, Amnesty International had to
decide where to focus its efforts as there were 117 countries with death penalty provisions.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE DEATH PENALTY vi-x (1979).
5. See, e.g., R. YtSTIL, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 3-23 (1978) (ranks countries on a scale
of one through seve n from most to least free).
6. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 167 (1980) (report on 1500 political pris-
oners in Uruguay).
7. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIOHTS PRACTICES 329 (1981) (re-
port on the torture of 5,600 people in Argentina).
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to die from starvation."
A third apprdach is to review the human rights problems of all na-
tions and to consider the potential for rectifying each problem in each
country. The Carter administration used this approach in developing a
strategy for each nation which encouraged improvements on a country-
by-country basis. While a government has the resources to take such a
universal approach and must maintain relations with all nations, 9 non-
governmental and individual human rights activists lack the resources
to undertake a universal inventory of problems and have the ability to
be more selective in targeting areas for action.10
A fourth approach is to take problems on a first-come, first-served
basis. Unfortunately, the first case which may be brought to light
might not be particularly serious, or be amenable to improvement.
This approach could quickly overwhelm the organization with individ-
ual cases of relatively slight significance.
A fifth strategy combines some aspects of the other approaches, but
takes account of the limited resources and other difficulties facing non-
governmental and individual human rights advocates. Under this case-
by-case approach, the human rights activist might consider a series of
questions: first, is there sufficient information to document the alleged
violations and thus to justify the possible measures that might be used?
Different levels of information may support measures of differing
coerciveness. I I
Second, are the violations sufficiently serious to justify particular at-
tention? Almost all violators will contend that they have been unflarly
selected for attention. This defense is spurious, because all violators
should be encouraged to reform. Nevertheless, the human rights activ-
ists ought to allocate limited resources, and prepare against such a se-
lective persecution defense, by choosing only the most egregious
situations for attention. These serious cases should be capable of gen-
erating the broadest global consensus to ameliorate the situation. It
must be recognized that some extraneous political considerations may
8. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1979, at
463 (1980) (report on 1,500,000 people starving in Kampuchea).
9. Weissbrodt, Human Rights Legislation and United States Foreign Policy, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 231, 281 (1977).
10. See Weissbrodt, The Role of International Nongovernmental Organizations in the Im-
plementation of Human Rights, 12 Tax. INT'L L.J. 293, 297 (1977). See also Clark, The Inter-
national League for Human Rights and South West Africa 1947-1957." The Human Rights
NGOs as Catalst in the International Legal Process, 3 HuM. RTS. Q. 101 (1981).
11. Weissbrodt & McCarthy, Fact-finding by International Nongovernmental Human
Rights Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 5, 77 (1981).
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affect the ability to generate such a consensus, 12 but the credibility of
the actor depends on the ability to demonstrate an impartial concern
for human rights.
Third, is there reason to believe that the problem is amenable to im-
provement by one or more of the measures available to the actor? Indi-
cations of the usefulness of action may be gauged from such subsidiary
questions as: have measures with this country or with respect to this
type of problem been successful in the past? Are the officials of the
country receptive to initiatives from outsiders? What sort of interven-
tion has the greatest potential for success and the least risk of further
damage to the human rights victims? The case-by-case approach re-
quires that a re-evaluation be regularly undertaken of the various is-
sues which prompted pursuit of a particular human rights violation.
Conditions change and the response of the target violator may require
tactical shifts or even abandonment of the matter.
Fourth, given the political, financial, and practical constraints on
human rights activists, which organization or individual is in the best
position to take effective measures in this case? Nongovernmental orga-
nizations strive generally to appear impartial and independent in purs-
ing human rights problems, but each NGO is constrained by the nature
of its staff, membership, financial supporters, geographical location, etc.
NGOs must, in each case, balance the desire to appear independent
and impartial against the need for self-preservation: in other words,
actors must consider the question, how will the pursuit of this case af-
fect us? The broader the NGO's political, financial, and membership
base the more successful will be its efforts to achieve independence,
impartiality, and effectiveness.
Fifth, how will any of the actor's measures be received by political
alies inside or outside of the target country? Will the contemplated
action fit with the political perspectives of the human rights victims to
be aided? Will they be able to use and build upon outside pressure for
domestic purposes? Or could they instead consider the contemplated
NGO action to be counterproductive to their cause? Can other NGOs,
governments, and intergovernmental organizations be expected to sup-
port this measure and take complementary actions? For example, a
U.S. based organization cannot concentrate on human rights violations
in Eastern Europe without appearing politically biased. Human rights
activity originating in Western Europe or in Third World countries
12. See H. STRACK, SANCTIONs 33-39, 237-53 (1978) (U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia
ineffectual given the importance of Rhodesia to many nations whose support was essential if
sanctions were to succeed).
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might be more effective in improving conditions in Eastern Europe.
Similarly, an Israeli organization would be ineffective in complaining
about rights violations in Syria and vice-versa.
Sixth, having decided that a particular human rights problem de-
serves attention, there remains the issue of which measures or series of
measures should be used. The tactics available to most human rights
organizations include fact-finding, diplomatic initiatives, letter-writing
campaigns, publicity, on-site missions, raising -human rights issues dip-
lomatically with violating governments, lobbying with governments,
business, or influential organizations to take trade, aid, professional, or
other measures against violating nations, legal action in the subject na-
tion or in other countries, aid to human rights victims or their families,
and the invocation of intergovernmental human rights procedures.
Any strategy should include an inventory of available techniques in
approaching the problem that has been selected for action. No rule
may be identified as to how measures should be ordered, although it is
generally best to use less coercive measures first to determine their im-
pact before resorting to more serious approaches. Also, less coercive
and less public measures may be appropriate while the facts are still
uncertain.
The five strategies outlined above and particularly the case-by-case
approach with its six subparts suggest some of the principal ways non-
governmental or individual human rights activists may, order their
efforts.
II. The Experience of Some Nongovernmental Organization With
Human Rights Strategies
A. Introduction
Having outlined a number of ways organizations and individual ac-
tivists may select human rights problems for intervention, it is useful to
see how several American public interest law organizations have actu-
ally selected matters for pursuit. While not perfectly analogous, the
efforts of U.S. lawyers and activists to end racism and to pursue certain
public interest issues may be more easily examined than those of inter-
national activists because the political limitations of a single country
provide a focus not so easily found in the world arena.
Admittedly, the domestic civil rights advocate and the international
human rights activist operate in quite different political and legalenvi-
ronments. Domestic civil rights and civil liberties lawyers work within
a relatively finite legal structure that includes Congress, the federal
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
courts, federal agencies, and their state counterparts. International
human rights lawyers have a far more diverse set of possible fora, in-
cluding the U.N., UNESCO, the International Labour Organization,
regional human rights systems (e.g., Organization of American States,
Council of Europe), Amnesty International, International Parliamen-
tary Union, other established nongovernmental organizations, as well
as all the national legal systems. Within the U.N. alone there are more
than a dozen principal bodies and several score procedures available
for various sorts of human rights problems. Also, domestic civil rights
and civil liberties lawyers confront a relatively confined political envi-
ronment with a generally familiar roster of actors. International poli-
tics must take account of many different domestic political climates, the
way those domestic realities are imperfectly represented by the individ-
uals at international meetings, and the traditions and practices of the
international organizations themselves.
Despite these differences, the civil rights lawyer and the international
human rights advocate face similar basic problems. Indeed, the dis-
tinction between a domestic civil rights lawyer and an international
human rights activist is becoming increasingly blurred. A competent
domestic civil rights lawyer can no longer ignore the international pro-
cedures available if domestic remedies have been exhausted or do not
permit the international human rights arguments in local courts. In
addition, both domestic and international procedures require choices of
client, target, forum, substantive principles, and requested remedy.
Domestic and international organizations alike struggle with political,
financial, membership, and other impediments, although the nature of
these constraints may vary. The experience of domestic civil rights and
civil liberties advocates is also helpful to international human rights
activists, as these domestic efforts have enjoyed a relatively well docu-
mented and understood history which can assist analysis.
B. Strategic Choices of the Public Interest Movement in the United
States
In this early stage of the development of the international human
rights movement, one of the most pressing questions is how to focus the
efforts of nongovernmental organizations and individuals concerned
with human rights in a way that most effectively utilizes limited re-
sources. The experience of the public interest law movement may pro-
vide lessons on how to allocate resources most effectively for the
protection of poorly represented or powerless groups.
The public interest law movements as broadly defined in this Coin-
Vol. 8:62, 1981
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ment includes public interest law firms working with environmental
and consumer issues, the Legal Services poverty law program, and the
NAACP's campaign to end segregation. 13 These diverse organizations
13. A definition of public interest law reasonably begins with an idea of what constitutes
"the public interest." Some commentators characterize the public interest as a single interest
presumably shared by all citizens. See, e.g., M. MEYERSON & E. BANFIELD, POLITICS,
PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 322 (1955). Other commentators doubt that any one
interest could be shared by an entire society, but submit that the public interest is based on
consensus among the "preponderance" of people. See, e.g., Downs, The Public Interest: Its
Meaningin a Democracy, 29 Soc. RESEARCH 5 (1962). Still others describe the public inter-
est as a balancing of private interests for the common good. See, e.g., F.R. MARKS, K.
LEWSING & B. FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
51 (1972). John Rawls provides a recent and important ethical delineation of the public
interest in his concept of "justice as fairness." J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971).
Finally, Burton Weisbrod offers a definition which emphasizes efficiency in the allocation of
resources and equity in the division of society's income, output, and opportunities as rele-
vant dimensions of the public interest. B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER & N. KOMESAR, PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 8 (1978). For a comprehen-
sive review of the literature on-the public interest, see NoMos V: THE PUBLIC INTEREST (C.
Fredrich ed. 1962); V. HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS (1970).
In general, public interest law is defined as the representation of the under-represented. S.
JAFFE, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW 11 (1976). "The issues to which [public interest law] directs
itself may run the gamut from the protection of wildlife to provision of adequate housing for
the urban poor." Woods & Derrick, Symposium: The Practice of Law in the Public Interest-
Introduction, 13 ARiz. L. REv. 797, 798 (1971). Although the antecedents of the modem
public interest law movement can be traced back to the early 1900's, the movement
mushroomed in the late 60's as part of the nationwide protest against individual and public
powerlessness in the face of big business and bureaucratic government. See Berlin, Rois-
man & Kessler, Public Interest Law, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 675, 678 (1970); Riley, The
Challenge of the New Lawyers: Public Interest and Private Clients, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
547, 582-87 (1970).
For descriptions of some modem public interest law firms including structure, objectives,
and estimates of effectiveness, see B. WEISBROD, J. HANDLER & N. KOMESAR, supra, at 149-
470; Adams, Responsible Militancy.-The Anatomy of a Public Interest Law Firm, 29 REC.
A.B. CITY N.Y. 631 (1974); Cowan, Woman's Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of
the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUMAN
RIGHTS L. REV. 373 (1976); Halpern & Cunningham, Reflections on the New Public Interest
Law: Theory andPractice at the Centerfor Law and Social Policy, 59 GEO. L.J. 1095 (1971).
For description and analysis of public interest law outside the United States, see Cappel-
letti, Government and Private Advocatesfor the Public Interest in Civil Litigation: A Compara-
tive Study, 73 MICH. L. REV. 793 (1975); Sward & Weisbrod, Public Interest Law: Collective
Action in an International Perspective, 3 URB. L. & PoL'Y 59 (1980).
The Africa Legal Assistance Project of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, in Washington, D.C., the Center for Coristitutional Rights in New York City, the
Center for Law and Social Policy in Washington, D.C., the International Human Rights
Law Group in Washington, D.C., and the Lawyers Committee for International Human
Rights are five U.S. NGOs which have undertaken domestic litigation to further interna-
tional human rights objectives. LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW,
AFRICA LEGAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT-INTERIM REPORT 36-39 (1974); CENTER FOR CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHTS, DOCKET REPORT 18 (1974), 1 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
GROUP DOCKET 1 (No. 1 1981); Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting Interna-
tional Human Rights Norms, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 153 (1978); Stein, Public Interest Litigation
and United States Foreign Policy, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 375 (1977); Weissbrodt, Domestic
Legal Activi y in Furtherance of International Human Rights Goals, in IMPLEMENTING IN-
TERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH THE DOMESTIC LEGAL PROCESS 10 (W. Raymond
ed. 1976).
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possess a common goal of representing groups and values that histori-
cally have been underrepresented in the U.S. political and legal sys-
tems. Each organization has made strategic decisions about how best
to address the massive tasks they have confronted.
Analysis of the public interest law movement reveals that, in general,
an organization whose goal is to further the public interest has four
levels of decisions to make about the services it will provide. First, it
must decide whether an attempt should be made to help every potential
client in need of assistance. Second, if everyone will not be helped,
some policy must be devised for determining the general category of
problems that will be addressed. Third, once an overall policy is estab-
lished, criteria must be formulated to help determine which matters
further the overall goals of the organization. Fourth and finally, the
organization must decide whether processing cases is enough or
whether furtherance of the overall policy requires organizational efforts
outside the legal system.
The first two levels of decision are examined in light of the general
experience of the Office of Economic Opportunity Legal Services pro-
gram and public interest law firms. The third level, actual case selec-
tion, is explored by tracing the case selection strategy used by the
NAACP in its attack on racial segregation in American institutions.
The perceived successes and failures of the movement as a whole form
the basis for investigating the fourth decisional level.
1. The First Level- The Decision to Select Clients
The first decision a public interest organization must make is
whether to reject some clients who seek its help. Although this step
seems clearly necessary if an organization desires to focus its energies,
underlying assumptions about the legal system and the lawyer's role
have made it difficult for some public interest organizations. In fact,
early poverty lawyers resisted taking the step, to the point of almost
permanently emasculating the young OEO-Legal Services program.14
The reason for the resistance was twofold. First, the Legal Aid pro-
gram,'a forerunner and parent of the Legal Services Corporation, at-
tributed the problems of the poor to their limited access to justice-
14. Earl Johnson, Jr., director of the Legal Services program through its early years, has
said that the decision to switch from a service orientation to the more focused law reform
strategy was the most significant of his career. He predicts that if it had not been made, the
program could not have had an impact on poverty. E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM:
THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 132-33 (1974); e. Cooper,
Public Interest Law: South Africa Style, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 105, 113-14 (1979-
80) (contrast of U.S. with South Africa).
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dispensing institutions.1 5 As a result, the founders of Legal Aid be-
lieved that supplying a lawyer to every poor person was the cure for
poverty. The inherent assumption in this approach is that the legal sys-
tem can rectify all injustice. Second, the belief that a public interest
lawyer could effect social change while retaining the traditional law-
yer's role of the value-free advocate contributed to the reluctance to
reject some clients. In this view, poverty lawyers should follow the
example of their colleagues and let the client choose the issue. Inter-
jecting the advocate's values by selecting clients went against the legacy
of the profession.16
International human rights workers, many of them lawyers, also un-
doubtedly resist the idea of systematically ignoring some of the pleas
for help that reach them. The staffs of human rights organizations are
frequently overwhelmed by the volume of work, the pressing responsi-
bility, and the lack of sufficient guidance concerning which cases re-
quire attention. The experience of the Legal Services Corporation
teaches, however, that the decision to reject some cases in order to more
thoroughly pursue others is crucial. One year after the federal program
was funded, the folly of accepting too many clients and trying to reach
too many goals became apparent to the Legal Services management.17
The offices were being swamped with more clients than the lawyers
could adequately serve. The program was drifting towards complete
preoccupation with processing case loads at the price of losing sight of
innovative, pragmatic goals. In addition, critics of the early service ori-
entation charged that the advocates themselves began to internalize the
crisis syndrome of the poor, becoming wholly preoccupied with the de-
mands of the present moment and losing the creative ability to avert
15. Reginald Heber Smith, founder of the Legal Aid movement stated: "We can end the
existing denial ofjustice to the poor if we can secure an administration ofjustice which shall
be accessible to every person no matter how humble .. " R. SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE
POOR 240 (1919). See generally J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976).
16. Some suggest that in the area of public interest law, client selection and rejection is
not only a practical matter, but the only ethical strategy. The service-oriented public interest
lawyer feels the tension b~tween Canon 2 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, *the
obligation to serve, and Canons 6 and 7, the obligations to provide competent and zealous
advocacy even where resources are inadequate. The inevitable corollary to an emphasis on
the number of people served is that the quality of service received by each person is reduced.
A combined reading of a number of code sections reveals a clear prohibition against falling
below a certain level of quality in order to increase the quantity of clients served. Hence,
client selection and rejection seem ethically as well as practically mandated for organiza-
tions seeking to further public interest goals. For further discussion of the ethics of rejecting
clients under the Code of Professional Responsibility, see Bellow & Kettleson, From Ethics
to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U.L. Rnv. 337,
343-53 (1978).
17. See E. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 127-38.
The Yale Journal of World Public Order
crisis. 18 Accordingly, it was out of practical necessity that the Legal
Services management devised a selection strategy.
Similarly, Amnesty International (A.I.) has struggled with the choice
between work for individual prisoners of conscience and efforts on be-
half of large groups of prisoners. In some countries, for example Indo-
nesia, where there were thousands of prisoners, many unidentified, it
seemed pointless to work for the release of a few dozen individuals. 19
Also, A.I. found that in other countries, for example, Uganda under Idi
Amin, it was counter-productive to work for the release of a named
individual. 20 Slowly-particularly in the late 1970's-A.I. shifted more
and more effort towards country campaigns and diverted research re-
sources away from individual prisoner adoptions.21 The pursuit of in-
dividual claims was not completely abandoned, however. A.I. found
that individual prisoner adoptions were still necessary as they gener-
ated the greatest amount of personal involvement among the member-
ship and provided an indispensable recruitment incentive. Moreover,
individual cases usefully illustrated in a personal way the human di-
mension of massive human rights problems.
2. The Second Level- An Overall Policy
The experience of the public interest law movement forcefully dem-
onstrates the need for case selection in order to allocate limited re-
sources efficiently. The next level of decision requires settling upon an
overall selection policy. In the public interest law movement the cru-
cial question at this juncture has been to what degree client selection
should be a product of the advocate's or organization's independent
judgment. 22 The decision to select certain clients alters the traditional
client-lawyer relationship. The lawyer ostensibly takes this step in or-
der to focus efforts and consequently improve the quality of service
provided the constituency as a whole. The problem, however, then be-
comes accountability; determining what selection decisions would be
most helpful to the constituency. At one end of the spectrum of pos-
sibilities is the assumption that the lawyer's subjective decision should
18. Cahn & Cain, Power to the People or the Profession? The Public Interest in Public*
Interest Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1005, 1013 (1970).
19. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INDONESIA, AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT
9, 144-46 (1977).
20. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1979, at 37 (1979)
(report on Uganda).
21. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1977, at 53-56
(1977); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1978, at 6, 29-31
(1978); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1980, at 8, 15-17
(1980); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1981, at 12-13
(1981).
22. See Comment, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1119-30 (1970).
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control. On the other side is the view that a community organization
should handle the selection question as representatives of the lawyer's
constituency.3
Many public interest law organizations have resolved the accounta-
bility problem by formulating an overall policy which limits the advo-
cates' independent discretion and focuses the energies of the
organization on actions that have wide-ranging and long-term effects.24
Such a policy assures that selected cases will be responsive to the over-
all needs of the community while conserving resources for the "impor-
tant cases." The international human rights organizations have
analogous accountability problems. They also need to limit the
number of human rights cases processed while remaining generally
responsive to the needs of human rights victims. A clear articulation of
an overall policy may serve both these goals.
23. Both models have inherent drawbacks. On the one hand, the advocate who sets up
personal values and perspectives as the only guide to case selection is in danger of becoming
unresponsive to the group of people he or she is trying to help. This danger is particularly
real for lawyers who represent a diffuse set of interests such as consumer, environmental,
civil, political, and economic values rather than an identifiable community. Reliance on
individual discretion may not produce selection decisions that effectively allocate resources.
Ralph Nader, an independent lawyer with no identifiable constituency, said he is held ac-
countable by the public's opinion of him: "The best check on the honesty of public interest
lawyers is their insecurity of role. If they're dishonest, or let the public down, they lose
whatever impact they might have. If I make a mistake, if I charge General Motors falsely, I
lose credibility." Comment, supra note 22, at 1130.
On the other hand, a requirement of rigid accountability deprives unorganized interests of
any voice. The primary impetus for the public interest law movement was the desire to
provide representation for powerless, unorganized groups and diffuse interests. G. HARRI-
SON & S. JAFFE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRa 9 (1973). Public interest lawyers cannot
be faulted for acting on their own initiative when no other perspective is voiced. Further-
more, even where a definite community exists and an organization could direct the activities
of public interest lawyers, such control may not be advisable. Community boards and
human rights organizations have been known to miss the reform potential in certain actions
and steer advocates toward cases of immediate urgency and no long-term impact. Com-
ment, supra note 22, at 1126. But see Calm & Cahn, The New Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARv.
L. Rnv. 929, 987-90 (1968) (asserting that poor people in the community often design far-
seeing programs).
24. For example, the following guidelines are relied upon in the selection of cases for the
Center for Law and Social Policy, Washington, D.C.:
(1) an important public interest is involved;
(2) the individuals and groups involved do not have the financial resources to retain
and compensate competent counsel for the matter involved;
(3) no other legal institution is likely to provide effective representation;
(4) the area of the law has not been adequately explored;
(5) opportunities for innovation are present;
(6) the subject matter is one in which the staff of the Center has competence;
(7) the activity is one in which there is substantial room for participation by students
at the Center, and
(8) the resources of the Center required are commensurate with the gains likely to be
achieved.
Halpern & Cunningham, supra note 13, at 1106.
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Analysis of public interest law policy determinations yields a list of
factors an organization should consider when formulating an overall
policy. First, the organization should have a policy focus, that is, a
theory of the underlying cause of the conditions it seeks to change.
Second, the organization should compare the effectiveness of alterna-
tive policies. Third, the feasibility of a proposed policy should be con-
sidered in light of current social and political circumstances. Fourth,
the structure and character of the implementing organization should
affect the policy choice. Fifth, the special skills of the staff and volun-
teers working in the organization should be considered. Finally, the
degree of control an organization exercises over its clientele should be
figured into the policy decision. Each of these factors will be examined
in the context of the public interest law movement with the goal of
helping international human rights organizations determine what fac-
tors are important to their own policy decisions.
The experience of the O.E.O. Legal Services program best illustrates
the contribution a policy focus makes to the process of formulating an
overall policy. At the time the Legal Services management decided to
de-emphasize the service-oriented approach inherited from the Legal
Aid movement, three policy options were formulated and available for
implementation. Each had a distinct focus.
One option was based on the "civilian perspective" theory put for-
ward by Edgar S. and Jean Camper Cahn. 25 The Cahns asserted that
the government's war on poverty failed because the government agen-
cies responsible for distributing income and opportunity were unin-
formed and unresponsive. In the Calms' view, the poor needed
representatives who would force these agencies to consider the "civil-
ian" perspective of the poor in their decision-making. The theory fo-
cused on the relationship between the poor and government agencies.
Had this theory been accepted, Legal Services policy would have re-
quired neighborhood law offices staffed with lawyers whose mission
was to act as liaison between the poor community and government
agencies.
The social rescue theory or New Haven proposal formed the basis of
the second policy alternative. 26 This theory focused on the poor them-
selves and their alleged inadequacy. The social rescue theory pictured
poor people as the victims of social, psychological, and educational de-
ficiencies that had to be treated to enable them to compete for a share
of the nation's affluence. In this scheme, lawyers would be a part of a
25., Calm & Calm, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964).
26. E. JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 26.
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multidisciplinary team that would treat all the problems of a particular
poor family.
The third policy option was law reform, which focused on the legal
system itself.27 The existing system diverts income away from the poor.
Law reformers attempted to modify the rules of the legal system and
applied the changed rules to benefit the poor. O.E.O. Legal Services
chose law reform as its overall policy for a number of reasons. Primary
among them was the underlying belief that the legal system could be
transformed from an institution that discriminated against the poor, to
one that benefited them.28 This belief formed the foundation of their
strategy.
A different and not as explicit focus is characteristic of public interest
law firms concerned with consumer, environmental, and housing is-
sues. In those firms, a version of the Cahns' "civilian perspective" the-
ory directs the lawyers' work. The public interest firm attempts to open
the government agency and corporate decision-making process to the
public.29 They trace the lack of public interest values in corporate and
government actions to the closed decision-making procedures that pre-
scribe those actions. 30 Accordingly, case selection and other strategies
used by poverty and public interest lawyers reflect their theories about
the causes of the conditions they seek to change. Therefore, as a first
step in formulating an overall strategy, international human rights or-
ganizations might be well advised to decide upon such a policy focus.
It is quite unclear whether the international human rights movement
has even begun to analyze the underlying causes of the conditions it
seeks to change-much less to start efforts at modifying the basic con-
ditions which cause human rights violations. Instead, many concerned
with human rights devote their energies to describing horrible viola-
tions without either trying to discern their causes or to develop tech-
niques for improving the situation. Other human rights advocates have
attempted to cajole the principal violators-that is, governments-into
agreeing on the basic human rights norms and then have sought tech-
niques for assuring the implementation of these norms. Even those
27. Id. at 132.
28. Id See Comment, supra note 22, at 1072 ("Poverty is both a cause and a conse-
quence of under-representation in the legal-political process.").
29. Rabin, Lawyersfor Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L.
REv. 207, 230 (1978). But see Comment, supra note 22, at 1070-71 n.3 (questioning the value
of the process-oriented approach in public interest law).
30. Chief Justice Burger, then on the D.C. Circuit, challenged the myth of public repre-
sentation by government agencies in United Church of Christ v. Federal Trade Commission,
359 F.2d 994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966) where he stated: "The theory that the Commission can
always effectively represent listener interests. . . without the aid of. . . legitimate listener
representatives.., is.. . no longer a valid assumption .... "
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who devote considerable energy to finding ways to reduce human
rights violations are frequently trying to treat the symptoms repre-
sented by the violations without adequate analysis of their causes.
Very different targets and techniques may be appropriate for dealing
with causes of human rights problems than have been thus far used for
treating the symptoms of violations.
For example, in addition to campaigns to end torture, the death pen-
alty, political murders, etc., some thought might be given to why
governments find a need to be repressive. One hypothesis might run as
follows: governments-particularly in developing countries-have ac-
cepted an export-led growth model which requires social and political
stability. In many countries the army is the only institution sufficiently
organized to be capable of ensuring stability. The army takes control,
represses dissent, and violates the human rights of dissenters. But the
army is not capable of dealing successfully with the distribution of
power and wealth in society. Hence, if economic development begins
to occur, dissatisfaction grows, and the army feels the need to increase
its repression. Strife ensues with very uncertain results.
If an organization accepts this hypothesis about the cause of human
rights violations, anti-torture campaigns would be less important than
efforts to re-evaluate the export-led growth model and to convince the
army about the need to distribute the benefits of development more
equitably in order to obviate the need for repression. In any case, far
greater thought must be given to why human rights violations occur
before a strategy can be charted to end those violations.
In choosing an overall strategy, a second important factor is the com-
parative cost effectiveness of alternative approaches. The law reform
approach favored by the public interest law movement can create a
large number of beneficiaries at low cost. The Social Rescue Theory,
described above, was rejected by the legal services program partly on
the grounds that only a few families could be helped at great expense.
In contrast, a limited number of cases motivated by law reform objec-
tives may change millions of lives. The NAACP case study contained
in the next section amply illustrates this principle.
The third factor, practical feasibility, eliminates some policy alterna-
tives. For example, a policy option at one time considered by the legal
services movement involved a concentrated effort to organize poor peo-
ple into groups that could exert pressure in the political and private
economic spheres. One of the main reasons for dropping this option
was its political unpopularity. It was predicted that the office holders
who controlled the legal services budget would not be well-disposed
toward a program that encouraged political unrest and developed a
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popular platform for future political opponents.3 1 Foundation-sup-
ported law firms consider themselves freer to take controversial stands
and to implement politically unpopular programs than their govern-
mentally financed counterparts. Clearly, international human rights
organizations should be aware of the corresponding political and
financial implications of the policies they choose.
A fourth element to be considered in developing a policy is the struc-
ture of the organization, including the number of volunteers and people
on the staff. The structure and support staff of the public interest law
firm permits an ongoing relationship with government agencies. The
firm can monitor administrative maneuvers and know when to inter-
vene in administrative processes, bring suit, or encourage legislative ac-
tion. In addition, if the staff is large enough, each member has an
opportunity to develop expertise in complicated areas and keep abreast
of developments. Environmental and consumer interests probably
could not have been as effectively represented by an organization that
relied on a loose volunteer structure. The structure of international
human rights organizations will also affect overall policy. The volun-
teer nature and small size of some human rights organizations probably
precludes close, continual scrutiny of governments.3 2
Fifth, the skills of the workers in an organization also influence the
policy-making decision. For the public interest law movement, law re-
form was an attractive strategy because it enabled the lawyers to do
what they do best. Community organizing or economic booster pro-
grams were not as attractive because they did not use the specific skills
of the staff. An international human rights group should assess the
skills of its staff and volunteers. If many are not lawyers or are unfa-
miliar with intergovernmental human rights procedures, a test-case
type strategy may be less appropriate than efforts toward organizing
interest groups and publicizing widespread violations.
Finally, the degree of control an organization has over its clientele
also shapes policy. Environmental and consumer interest law firms
monitoring agency activities can identify a possible litigation or lobby-
ing opportunity and find a client. 33 Because clients for these firms do
not possess a substantial personal stake in the outcome of a case, the
31. The Reagan administration's effort to remove or prune the Legal Services Corpora-
tion on budgetary and political grounds demonstrates the potential for backlash when the
activities of the public interest organization conffict with extant political realities. See Drew,
Legal Services, NEw YORKER, Mar. 1, 1982, at 97, 98, 104, 106, 112.
32. A small group of people is not practically capable of continually monitoring the
more than 160 nations in the world. Even within one of the largest human rights organiza-
tions a researcher may cover events in half a dozen nations or more. Hence, these NGOs
often shift their focus as catastrophes occur.
33. Rabin, supra note 29, at 234. Two of the largest environmental public interest firms,
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firm has a great degree of control. The legal services attorney, by com-
parison, is much more limited; he or she must weigh the welfare of a
particular client against the desire to undertake a test case litigation.
Many international nongovernmental organizations pursue human
rights violations without much contact with the individual victims. In
that sense, they have a large amount of control. In another sense, their
duty to the human rights victims, like poverty lawyers' duties to their
clients, limits their freedom to pursue strategies which may be unac-
ceptable to victims.
For example, human rights victims in developing nations may not
want their advocates to pursue bilateral governmental measures that
take advantage of the economic dependence of developing countries
and that may further those structures of dependence. Some nongov-
ernmental organizations are sensitive to such concerns and others are
not. This aspect of an organization's relationship with the people it is
trying to help should also affect its strategy choices.
In sum, the interplay of these six factors, at least, should enter into an
organization's determination of an overall strategy in its approach to
international human rights problems.
3. The Third Level- Choosing SecKc Cases
The experience of the public interest law movement recommends a
type of test-case strategy as the most cost-effective policy for an organi-
zation of limited resources. In choosing cases or legislative initiatives,
the initial and fairly obvious rule that emerges is a preference for cases
and problems with the widest possible impact at the least cost. The
most attractive issue for a public interest law firm is the one that modi-
fies the law in a way which directly benefits a great number of its con-
stituents. The poverty law field provides a substantial number of cases
that increased the flow of resources to the poor community by, for ex-
ample, liberalizing welfare eligibility requirements34 and increasing the
minimum wage for migrant farm workers. 35 In addition, several un-
successful efforts have been made to force states to increase welfare
Natural Resources Defense Council (N.R.D.C.) and Environmental Defense Fund (E.D.F.)
are membership organizations and each serve as their own plaintiff.
34. For example, King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), struck down the substitute parent
rule, by which states denied A.F.D.C. benefits to mothers who permitted men to live in their
houses, as inconsistent with the Social Security Act. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), invalidated one-year residency requirements for welfare benefits. See Sullivan, Law
Reform and the Legal Services Crisis, 59 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1, 5-7 (1971).
35. Eg., Rivera v. Divison of Industrial Welfare, 265 Cal. App. 2d 576,71 Cal. Rptr. 739
(1968) (ordering a S.25 an hour wage increase for 200,000 California farmworkers).
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benefit levels.36 More often than not, however, an organization does
not meet social reform goals by winning one case. Normally, the re-
form process is incremental and requires strategic case selection at each
stage.
One example of this type of strategy can be found in the NAACP's
efforts to end racial segregation in U.S. education.37 Almost since its
establishment in 1910, the NAACP focused its energies on confronting
national issues concerning blacks, not on running local legal aid clinics.
From 1910 on, lawyers and activists for the NAACP frequently met to
discuss strategies that would be most effective in eliminating the racism
then sanctioned under state and national law.3 8
Segregation in education had always been of major concern to the
NAACP, and in the 1920's it became the target of an NAACP legal
campaign. Initially, the NAACP considered a strategy which targeted
the seven most discriminatory states for a litigation effort aimed at
equalizing separate facilities. They later abandoned this approach in
favor of one that challenged segregation itself. The NAACP recog-
nized the futility of a frontal attack on the nineteenth century Supreme
Court decision in Plessy v. Ferguson39 which upheld "separate-but-
equal" treatment of the races in public facilities. Hence, it concen-
trated on the inequality of education for blacks as a way of impugning
the states' application of Plessy.
In line with this strategy, a plan was developed to attack segregation
at the graduate and professional school levels.4° These schools were
blatant examples of the unequal and discriminatory results of segrega-
tion. The immediate object of these lawsuits, admission of blacks to
36. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (allocation of public welfare
funds is discretionary and in the hands of the state).
37. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975) for a detailed account of the history of
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. It has been suggested that there is a parallel between the status of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights now and the status of the Fourteenth Amendment before
1954 (when the latter was contained in the Constitution, but its full potential in the struggle
against segregation lay dormant). Blacks turned to the courts to achieve enforcement of the
Amendment. Ultimately, the constituency for human rights will also make itself felt in the
courts. International Human Rights Law Group, Civil Rights and Human Rights: Practi-
tioner's Perspectives (September 1980) (unpublished summary of a conference held on Sep-
tember 7-9, 1979) (comments of Professor Woodward) (on file with The Yale Journal of
World Public Order). See also Yudof, International Human Rights and SchoolDesegregation
in the United States, 15 TEx. INT'L L.J. 1, 2-3 (1980).
39. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
40. There were practical problems in putting this strategy into action. Although it
seemed preferable to begin the attack on segregation in a border state, where resistance was
lower than in the Deep South, the NAACP had to bring suit where it could find willing
plaintiffs. Many blacks were unaware of their rights at this time. Those who were aware
were better educated and had more to lose from white reprisals; thus they often were unwill-
ing to take such a hazardous step.
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these institutions, was overshadowed by the larger purpose of establish-
ing that due process and equal protection imposed upon the states the
obligation to supply opportunities that were bona fide equal.41 The
NAACP anticipated that the enormous expense of maintaining two sets
of genuinely equal facilities would compel the abandonment of segre-
gation in higher education. 42 The NAACP could then turn its attention
to desegregation of undergraduate colleges, secondary schools, and
finally, the public elementary schools. There would also be less white
resistance to desegregating higher education rather than the more so-
cially sensitive primary schools.
Law schools were a prime target for initial attack. Judges, them-
selves most often lawyers, could see the inequality, and thus the illegal-
ity, of separate-but-equal law schools. In 1936, University of Maryland
v. Murray43 became the first victory for blacks under the strategy when
the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld a lower court order to admit the
black plaintiff to the University of Maryland Law School. A few years
later the Supreme Court reached a similar decision. 44
In 1950, the Supreme Court decided two cases that encouraged the
NAACP and black litigants, yet held firm to the separate-but-equal
doctrine. Sweatt v. Painter45 established that only real equality satisfies
the constitutional requirements underlying the separate-but-equal doc-
trine. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education46
marked another step by holding that if separate facilities were not pro-
vided, no individual or group should suffer harassment in an integrated
school. Accordingly, graduate and professional schools were begrudg-
ingly desegregated, while Plessy remained viable law.
Only two months after the Sweatt and McLaurin decisions, a Dela-
ware state court, after finding inequality between the college facilities
offered to the two races, ordered that black applicants be admitted to a
white undergraduate university.4 7 Similarly, the Missouri Supreme
Court chipped away at Plessy by holding that a black high school stu-
dent was entitled to take an aeromechanics course offered at the white
high school if his school did not provide one.48
41. R. BARDOLPH, THE CIVIL RIGHTS RECORD 270 (1970).
42. At the beginning of the 1930's there were only two graduate or professional schools
for blacks in the South-Howard University in Washington, D.C. and Meharry Medical
College in Nashville. See R. KLUGER, supra note 37, at 136.
43. 169 Md. 478, 182 A. 590 (1936).
44. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
45. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
46. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
47. See R. KLUGER, supra note 37, at 289-90 (the Delaware case was not officially
reported).




Finally, in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,49 the Supreme
Court directly confronted the constitutionality of the separate-but-
equal doctrine in education. The Court addressed this sensitive issue
because the lower court had established that the black and white
schools were essentially equal.50 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that school segregation was unconstitutional as a violation
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.51
The Supreme Court decision in Brown gave significant impetus to a
mass political movement that ultimately did more to end desegregation
than did all the Supreme Court decisions on the issue.5 2 Brown was
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). While the NAACP pursued its incremental attack on segrega-
tion, the mood of the country was changing. Beginning in the 1920's, social scientists
launched an extensive attack on racism. See R. KLUGER, supra note 37, at 309-14. This
attack gained momentum with the publication of Gunnar Myrdal's frontal attack on racism.
G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944). The NAACP made substantial use of this
sociological and psychological data in its struggle to end racism. See, e.g., Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (expert testimony on the impact of segregation on the
psychological well-being of black children relied on by district court in one of its findings of
fact).
In the 1940's the public condemnation of fascism intensified the awareness of the need for
equality of black citizens. The United States was "'embarrassed in the conduct of foreign
relations by acts of discrimination taking place in this country."' Statement of Ernest
Gross, Legal Advisor to the Secretary of State (Oct. 29, 1947), in R. KLUGER, supra, at 253.
President Truman reacted to this subtle change in attitude, and, in 1948, he issued executive
orders ending official discrimination in Federal employment and segregation in the armed
forces.
50. Brown v. Board of Education, 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd 347 U.S.
483, 492 (1954).
51. 347 U.S. at 495. While the Supreme .Court declared school segregation unconstitu-
tional, it was constrained by political realities in the South from ordering an immediate end
to this unconstitutional condition. Southern reaction to the Brown decision ranged from
restraint to outrage. Recognizing the problems of implementing Brown in light of the "wide
applicability of [the] decision, and because of the great variety of local conditions," the
Court delayed its decision on implementation until it heard arguments from state and local
authorities regarding the proper mode of enforcement. In 1955, the Court remanded the
cases to the district courts, which were to retain jurisdiction during local implementation of
the Court's order with concern for the "varied local school problems" and "with all deliber-
ate speed." Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (Brown
II). The South took full advantage of this vague mandate and successfully resisted integra-
tion in many areas for many years.
This Southern "foot-dragging" came to an early crisis in Little Rock during September
1957, when Arkansas' Governor Faubus defied the federal courts by crdering state troops to
Little Rock's Central High School to prevent the admission of nine black children whose
request to be enrolled had been upheld by judicial order. See R. BARDOLPH, supra note 41,
at 432-34; Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). President Eisenhower sent in a unit of the
United States Army to sustain the authority of the federal government.
Not until 1969 did the Court reconsider the pace of desegregation and state that "all
deliberate speed.., is no longer constitutionally permissible. ... The obligation of every
school district is to terminate dual school systems at once." Alexander v. Holmes County
Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969).
52. This political movement culminated in the passage of several profoundly important
civil rights laws during the Johnson Administration. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437,
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applied in other areas such as public transportation and use of public
facilities.53 The Court, however, declined to apply the Brown doctrine
to the very sensitive issue of anti-miscegenation laws. In a 1955 case
brought by an attorney unconnected with the NAACP, the Court re-
fused to address the constitutional issue of the validity of a Virginia
statute prohibiting miscegenation,5 4 and in fact remanded the case to
the Virginia Court of Appeals, which adhered to its prior decision void-
ing the racially mixed marriage.5 5 The Court hesitated to decide this
most difficult and sensitive subject so soon after Brown, perhaps sens-
ing the angry mood of white resistance and fearing a total repudication
of their authority. Not until 1967, in Loving v. Virginia,56 did the Court
finally strike down the legal impediments to interracial marriage as a
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The international human rights movement has a number of lessons
to learn from this brief history of the U.S. civil rights movement. First,
in order to be at all effective one must identify an evil, such as racism.
Second, one cannot expect to achieve an easy or prompt victory, but
must pursue a gradualist strategy identifying those targets which are
most amenable to change, for example, as the NAACP identified grad-
uate schools in the border states. In regard to human rights as with any
social problem, only incremental improvements feasibly may be
sought. Initial targets ideally should elicit the weakest resistance by the
violators of human rights and should at the same time be capable of
generating the broadest public support and enthusiasm within the or-
ganization itself. Some matters may discourage volunteers and staff,
while others may energize them. The selection of these initial targets
might also be substantially influenced by the availability and location
of potential complainants and informants.
The lawyer who sought prompt Supreme Court action in 1955 to
void anti-miscegenation laws evidently committed a common error
among activist lawyers who fail to think strategically. The lawyer
sought a prompt ruling, which might have jeopardized the long-term
development of legal principles against racism in the United States.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-56
(1964).
53. See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956), af'g per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707
(M.D. Ala. 1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955), vacatingper
cur/am 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955), affgper cur/am 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches and
bathhouses).
54. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, vacated and remanded, 350 U.S. 891, 350
U.S. 985 (1955).
55. Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 734, 90 S.E.2d 849 (1956).
56. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Society, and therefore the Court, were not prepared for the issue of
anti-miscegenation laws during that period soon after Brown. The law-
yer, unlike the Supreme Court, lacked a sense of how important it is to
build institutional legitimacy through the careful selection of matters to
present for decision. Unfortunately, not all institutions possess the
means, desire, or understanding to avoid such strategic errors. Activist
lawyers and organizations must consider the impact of their efforts on
the long-term legitimacy of the institutions from which they may seek
relief.
A third lesson to be learned from the history of the civil rights move-
ment is that activists must use a broad range of information about the
causes of the evil they wish to eradicate. They should in turn attempt
to generate scholarly and public awareness about the evil and early
victories against it. These early victories must be used, insofar as possi-
ble, to create a broad basis of public concern and embarrassment-
nationally and internationally. Indeed, sometimes a case may be pur-
sued because it has the possibility of not only achieving some concrete
improvement, but also of dramatizing the underlying problem. The
possibility of remedy, even if insufficient, may attract far more public
attention and may better contribute to the ultimate resolution of
problems than direct efforts at seeking publicity, such as press releases
and press conferences. These lawsuits, or other similar techniques, can
constitute "publicity plus.15 7 Fourth, activists can be most effective in
using the contradictions between the promises of the violators and any
lack of fulfillment of these promises. Fifth, human rights activists must
not be distracted from their ultimate objectives by momentary proce-
dural victories.58 In addition, the benefits that might flow from the
establishment of precedent should not be overlooked. For example, the
U.N. Working Group on Chile59 helped to establish a precedent that
later supported the formation of the Working Group on the Disap-
peared. 60 Similarly, the U.N. Trust Fund for Human Rights Victims in
Chile was converted into a trust fund for human rights violations
57. I am indebted to Professor Frank Newman of the University of California-Berkeley
Law School for this term. Cf. Note, The Letelier Case: Foreign Sovereign LiabilityforActs of
PoliticalAssassination, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 251 (1981); National Lawyers Guild, Suit Seeks
Endto Intervention in ElSalvador, TWIN CITEs GUILD, April, 1982, at 1-2 (copy on file with
The Yale Journal of World Public Order).
58. See note 63 infra.
59. For a summary of the work performed by this U.N. Working Group, see Report of
the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Situation of Human Rights in Chile, U.N. Doc. A/32/
227, at 8-9, 45-58 (1977); Report of the Expert on the Question of the Fate of the Disap-
peared in Chile, U.N. Doc. A/34/583/Add. 1 (1979).
60. See Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1435, at 12, 15-19 (1981).
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throughout the world.61
4. The Fourth Level- Beyond the Test-Case
This discussion of public interest law strategies and the lessons they
hold for the international human rights movement would not be com-
plete without mentioning some basic criticisms of the test-case strategy.
Critics charge that the test-case strategy deflects energy that should be
devoted to alleviating the real causes of poverty and powerlessness.6 2
In this view, legal reform without social reform has little real impact.
Test cases establish new legal rights, and additional grievances inun-
date the courts, but the status quo survives. 63 These critics advocate a
more direct attack on the U.S. economic hierarchy by organizing pow-
erless groups into a potent political force. 4 Organizations with this
philosophy use test-cases to bring people together rather than to reform
the law. Other critics say that the test-case strategy makes the power-
less community dependent on the "foreign aid" of the public interest
lawyer.6 5 They say the most cost-effective way to bring about social
change is to concentrate on educating people about their rights and
developing ways for them to be vindicated without the need of a legal
representative. 66 Moreover, these critics contend that the main bars to
strategically developing legal self-sufficiency for the poor are the law-
yers' reluctance to relinquish control of the movement and institutional
61. Comm. Human Rights Res. 35, 37 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 6-7, 236, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/1475 (1981).
62. Comment, supra note 22, at 1077-78.
63. In many ways the promise of Brown is still unfulfilled in American society. There is
equal access as a matter of law to educational institutions. There are more non-whites in
schools, colleges, and graduate programs, but whites have departed the cities for the sub-
urbs-thus resegregating schools and leaving many blacks in financially deprived school
systems. The courts have refused to respond to such challenges as white flight. It was useful
for courts and activists to attack the evils of overt and dejure racism in the early stages of the
civil rights movement in order to dramatize the plight of blacks and in order to end segrega-
tionist laws. The courts and American society, however, have retained this insistence on a
showing of intentional segregation as a predicate to a finding of unconstitutional treatment
and have failed to pursue actual equality for all black citizens. See Freeman, Legitimizing
Racial Discrimination Through Anti-discrimintion Law: 4 Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MrNN. L. Rav. 1049, 1052-57 (1978). In some ways the civil rights activities of
the NAACP and similar organizations have served to legitimize American society by ending
overt racism and by promoting an ideology of equality of opportunity without achieving
such an equality in fact.
Having ostensibly ended segregation by identifying the contradiction between the theory
of separate-but-equal and the realities of very unequal systems for blacks and whites, the
civil rights movement must now demonstrate the difference between the equality of opportu-
nity promised by the courts and the inequality actually found in American society.
64. Comment, supra note 22, at 1079.
65. Cahn & Cahn, supra note 18,7at 1012.
66. Id. at 1016-19.
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racism.67
Both of these criticisms should be considered by the international
human rights movement. They both call for a de-emphasis of the role
of the advocate-worker and an increased emphasis on devising means
for traditionally powerless groups to exert direct pressure on the sys-
tem.68 At least far greater effort must be devoted to encouraging na-
tional human rights organizations and movements that can more
directly achieve concrete improvements.
The natural reaction of a person or group trying to implement
change is to act as if its own skills and training define the best route to
change. Although the public interest law movement has succeeded in
altering legal doctrine, it is debatable how close the movement can
come to actually eliminating the problems that precipitated its creation.
Likewise, the international human rights worker may eventually find
that creating grounds and means for intervening when human rights
violations occur is not enough. At some point, the problem has to be
traced to root causes in the political, economic, and social structures
which create oppression.
Conclusion
Most human rights organizations and advocates are so compelled by
the terrible pressures of their critical work that they often lack the time
or resources to undertake the dispassionate planning of their efforts.
Nevertheless, they are forced each day to make policy choices from
which one can derive some impressions of their strategic approach to
human rights problems. This Comment has attempted a first response
to the question: "Where does one begin in improving conditions by
vindicating international human rights?" This question is of such
breadth that the present effort can be considered only a meager, tenta-
67. Id. at 1031-45.
68. Unfortunately, most NGO organizations are not well situated to organize powerless
groups at the grass roots level. Most international human rights organizations, such as Am-
nesty International and the International League, have been most effective in stimulating the
interest of middle class or upper class supporters. In Third World countries, they have ap-
pealed principally to professional groups, such as lawyers and intellectuals. Nevertheless,
these elite groups have the capacity to encourage indigenous human rights mechanisms that
might, in turn, benefit broader sections of the society.
One of the most exciting examples of grass roots organization with an international aspect
is the Land Army in India. By nonviolent group action, it has reclaimed large land holdings
for previously landless peasants. The efforts of the Land Army have received the attention
and intellectual support of the I.L.O. and the International Center for Law in Development,
which have tried to disseminate information about this phenomenon to legitimate and give
confidence to those who may wish to emulate its efforts. International Center for Law in
Development, Law in the Modification and Participatory Organization of the Rural Poor for
Self-Reliant Development 1-2 (unpublished memo, June, 1978).
The Yale Journal of World Public Order Vol. 8:62, 1981
tive beginning. One can only hope that, in the light of greater experi-
ence, others will improve the approaches suggested here.
